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COMPLETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
Michael P. Zuckert*
September 6, 1987-an apparent moment of triumph for James
Madison. In less than two weeks the Constitutional Convention
would complete its work, and its members would scatter to their
home states. There would be a new constitution to work for, a constitution far different from what most of the delegates would have
predicted before their deliberations began. More than any other
man, Madison was responsible for the document which emerged
from the Convention. No one in North America had spent more
time or given better thought to the causes of political discontent
under the Articles of Confederation. He came to Philadelphia with
a well-developed plan for a new system which he persuaded his Virginia colleagues to adopt as their own and to introduce at the outset
of business. The final Constitution was by no means identical to
this "Virginia Plan," but it was close enough to earn Madison the
sobriquet, "Father of the Constitution."
So September 6, 1787, was, one would think, a moment of triumph for James Madison. Yet he wrote that day to his friend
Thomas Jefferson, then ambassador to France, that he considered
the work of the Convention to have been essentially a failure:
"[T]he plan, should it be adopted, will neither effectuate its national
object nor prevent the local mischiefs which everywhere excite disgust against state governments."! Madison's pessimism derived
above all from the draft constitution's omission of a provision he
believed essential: the so-called "universal negative," which would
have given Congress "a negative in all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of the States." Congress, in other words, would have had
an absolute veto over all state legislation, a veto akin to (but
stronger than) that of the President over congressional acts.
Madison saw this extraordinary, even radical, device as the
capstone of his constitutional plan. It alone could solve two barriers to the effort to create a confederacy of republics. Madison and
•
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most (if not all) of the other framers accepted the statement of the
fundamentals of politics in the Declaration of Independence.
Above all, that meant a commitment to the proposition that government existed to secure the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. Madison and the other founders believed that
commitment could best, perhaps only, be fulfilled in popular republics. But popular republics had two major defects. First, republics,
normally small, had a stake in confederating with other republics,
but no successful principle of confederation had ever been discovered. Madison's analysis of the defects of previous confederacies
was complex, but one feature was particularly relevant: the member states of confederacies had a seemingly irresistible tendency to
"encroach" on each others' powers and on those of the general government of the confederacy. Second, republics regularly failed in
their internal governance as well. As Madison argued in his famous
The Federalist No. 10, republics had so far proven unable to tame
the evils of majority faction-injustice and instability in their laws,
producing a general "turbulence and folly."
The universal negative could solve both problems. It would
arm the general government with a regular and effective instrument
to fend off encroachments by the states against the center and
against each other. At the same time, the "better majorities,"
which would form at the national level according to the mechanism
of the extended sphere outlined in The Federalist No. 10, could
check the factious majorities in the states. Both functions of the
negative would serve to make republican governments in America
more effective protectors of the rights for the protection of which
governments existed. Without the negative, Madison feared, as he
said to Jefferson, the new system would provide neither an adequate
federalism nor an adequate security of rights within the states.
The Convention's failure to adopt the universal negative was
unsurprising, however, for Madison's proposal recalled a power exercised over the American colonies by the British authorities before
independence. But without it, Madison thought, the Constitution
remained fundamentally incomplete, and therefore would be neither
lasting nor just.
Madison lost at the Philadelphia Convention, but he renewed
his efforts during the first Congress in 1789. The occasion had its
ironies. During the debates on ratification of the new constitution,
the anti-federalists, friends to greater rather than lesser power in the
states, had made it one of the chief charges against the proposed
charter of government that it contained no bill of rights. These proponents of a bill of rights surely sought to protect citizens against
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the dangers posed by the large and distant general government. Yet
Madison, when he shepherded the proposed amendments through
the House of Representatives, added to those generally favored by
anti-federalists one which embodied some of the protection he
sought to effect in his universal negative. "No state," Madison's
surprise proposal read, "shall infringe the right to trial by jury in
criminal cases, nor the rights of conscience, nor the freedom of
speech or of the press." If Madison had had his way, then, the most
important of the Bill of Rights protections would have applied
against the states as well as against the general government from the
outset. But Madison was not, of course, to have his way. The Senate, more responsive to the states as states (as Madison had suspected it would be), quietly dropped his proposal. Under the
conditions of the day, it is most unlikely it would have been ratified
in any case.
The Constitution, even in its fundamentally incomplete state,
fared much better than Madison predicted in 1787. But when in
1847, Frederick Douglass posed his forceful rhetorical question"What country have 1?"-he was responding, whether he knew it
or not, to the incomplete Constitution Madison bemoaned in 1787.
And what was the great crisis of 1860-61 but the rending of the
constitutional order along the fault lines identified by Madison?
Madison feared that without an unequivocal device for keeping
the states in a proper federal order, the centrifugal forces would
overwhelm the constitutional balance, and the system would fly
apart. Such happened in secession. And with no decisive expression in the Constitution of the end of government within each of the
member states-justice and the security of rights-some of the
members came to claim that the chief principle of the system was
the absolute autonomy of each state over its internal affairs, the sole
function of the general government being to serve the general and
mutual interests of the states-all of them, neutrally and equally.
On the basis of that premise the Supreme Court concluded that
Congress could not forbid slavery in the territories, for the territories-and the Constitution itself, for that matter-existed for the
sake of the interests of all the states, without any commitment of its
own to the superiority of the internal principles of any state over
those of others. Thus "neutral principles" required that just as the
law allowed the Illinois man to take his hog into the territories, so it
must allow the Mississippi man to take his slave.
By the end of the Civil War, then, the country had had much

262

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 4:259

unhappy experience of the incompleteness of the Constitution.2
The major order of business after the war was "reconstruction," a
term and a process packed with several dimensions of ambiguity.
On one level, the seceded states required "reconstructing" before
they could resume their former place in the Constitutional order;
while the Constitutional order itself and as a whole required reconstructing as well. Along another dimension, the very idea of
"reconstruction" lent itself to an array of interpretations. At one
extreme one might identify "reconstruction" with something like
mere "restoration," i.e., the re-construction of what had been
before. Such a view would certainly describe dominant Southern
views of reconstruction, and perhaps President Johnson's as well.
At the other extreme "reconstruction" could mean a more or less
complete new-modelling, i.e., making something different on the old
site. Thaddeus Stevens in his desire to remake Southern society certainly held such a view with respect to reconstruction of the states.J
The extremes do not of course exhaust the possibilities. In fact
it is the argument of this essay that neither pole captures very well
the historic reality of reconstruction. The reconstructed Constitution was neither changed "only a little" as some argue, nor was it
fundamentally transformed as others aver. The best way to grasp
the constitutional reformation is in terms of Madison's concerns
about the "incomplete Constitution": the framers of the reconstruction amendments aimed to complete the Constitution along
much the same lines Madison unsuccessfully attempted. This essay
will focus on the first part of the reconstruction of the Constitution:
the thirteenth amendment.4
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Congress discussed the thirteenth amendment intensively on
two different occasions, once in the Thirty-Eighth Congress when
2. For an extensive survey of reflections on the inadequacy of the Constitution in the
Civil War era, see H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION, ch. VII (1973).
3. For contemporary usage along these lines see L. & J. Cox, PoLmcs, PRINCIPLES
AND PREJUDICE 1865-1866, at 130, 134 (1969).
4. The ultimate focus of my attention is the fourteenth amendment, for it goes furthest
and works with greatest clarity in this task of completing the Constitution, but the fourteenth
amendment cannot be understood properly except as a part of the surge of legislative action
following the war which included, most importantly, the thirteenth amendment and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 as well. See generally Farber & Muench, The Ideological Origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. CoMM. 235 (1984). In truth the story of the drafting of
the fourteenth amendment should be extended beyond that event also to include at least the
subsequent civil rights legislation up through the Civil Rights Act of 1875; but in this paper I
limit myself to the first part of the story only-the thirteenth amendment.
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the amendment itself was up for consideration, and again in the
Thirty-Ninth Congress when the Civil Rights Bill was debated.
The two discussions were quite different in character, and therefore
ought to be considered separately.s
To the modern eye the debates on the thirteenth amendment in
the Thirty-Eighth Congress have a distinctly odd look, for the central issue which preoccupied the members of Congress was, in effect, whether the proposed amendment to the Constitution was
itself constitutional.6 Opponents set the terms of the debate by
charging that the proposal deviated from the fundamental principles of the Constitution and thus could not (or at least morally and
politically should not) be adopted. Proponents responded that the
amendment was indeed congruent or even in some sense demanded
by the principles of the Constitution. In other words, the debate
posed the question of whether the amendment was fundamentally
consistent with and therefore completed the Constitution, as the
proponents claimed, or rather whether it overturned the Constitution, as opponents claimed.
Garrett Davis, Democratic senator from Kentucky, for example, considered it "irreferagably true, that the power of amending
the Constitution does not authorize the abolition of slavery." Indeed, he denied that "the power of amending the Constitution is
illimitable."? Joseph Edgerton, Democratic representative from Indiana, drew the conclusion from Davis' premise: "[S]o long as the
Federal Union exists there is not and should not be any political
power short of the free consent of each slaveholding State that can
rightfully abolish slavery in the United States."s
These Democrats could not deny entirely the existence of the
amending power, but they believed that a sound interpretation of
the document as a whole implicitly limited the amending power.
These opponents of the amendment generally agreed that the line
distinguishing valid from invalid exercise of the amending power
was crossed when, as here, there was an effort to reach the internal
structuring of the member states. Fernando Wood of New York
said it very clearly: "There was an implied and solemn understanding [at the time of the adoption of the Constitution] that the local
5. Many treatments of the thirteenth amendment collapse the two ·discussions, much
to the detriment of understanding both. Cf, e.g., M. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE
48-49 (1986); H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 386-404 (1982)
[hereinafter HYMAN & WIECEK]; H. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE ch.
8 (1978) [hereinafter MEYER].
6. H. BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 122 (1976) [hereinafter BELZ].
7. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1489 (1864).
8. /d. at 2985.
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and domestic institutions of the States should not be attempted to
be interfered with in any manner so as to be drawn within the

sphere of Federal authority." Without that understanding, Wood
asked, "Does any one suppose ... that the Constitution would have
been ratified by any of the States?"9 Representative Edgerton made
the same point: "The assertion of power or right in a majority of the
States, either through legislation of the Federal Government or
through amendments of the Constitution, to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of a State, such, for example, as slavery, essentially repudiates the principle upon which the union was
formed, namely the political equality of the States."w This amendment, said Representative Samuel Cox of Ohio, would "change the
... form and structure of our federative system in its most essential
feature." 11
That "most essential feature," Cox explained a week later, is
"the principle of self-government over state affairs." The Union,
properly understood, extends only to "three classes of functions,"
relations to foreign states, relations between the states, and "certain
powers which . . . to be useful and effective must be general and
uniform in their operation throughout the country."12 The proposed amendment then "breaks down ... the distinction between
the spheres of the States and national governments,"I3 a distinction
implicit in the entire fabric of the Constitution and explicitly affirmed in the ninth and tenth amendments. As Fernando Wood put
it:
These articles are the general rules for the construction and interpretation of the
entire instrument. Powers already granted may be modified, enlarged, or taken
away by an amendment, but those which are retained by the people, or reserved to
them, or to the states, cannot be delegated to the United States, except by the unani·
mous consent of all the States.14

Their point was not, as Alan Grimes would have it, to affirm that
"slavery was such an essential part of our constitutional system that
to allow Congress to abolish it would be tantamount to an unconstitutional change in the form of government."Is Rather, as Senator
Davis, the man whom Grimes cites to support his claim said:
"[P]roperty is a matter of State or domestic institution. The Gen9.
10.
I I.
12.
13.
14.
15.
(1978).

Id. at 294 I.
ld. at 2985.
CONG. GLOBE,

38th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1865).

ld. at 242.
ld.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864).
A. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
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eral Government does not legitimately, and were never intended to
have, any jurisdiction or authority over the subject of property....
That is a great and fundamental feature of our Federal and State
systems of government."l6
This "only reasonable construction of those articles" derived
some support from the experience of the use of the amending power
to that point. Madison, it will be recalled, had attempted to insert
an amendment limiting the powers of the states in his proposals for
the Bill of Rights, but that had failed; the two amendments adopted
since then were also only limits or regulations of the powers of the
federal government. In other words, in the first eighty years of the
government, through twelve amendments, no change in the Constitution had purported to affect the internal ordering of the states.
By crossing this line, the opponents believed, the Republican
majority was introducing "a revolutionary change in the Government." If this amendment can be passed, then, claimed Edgerton of
Indiana, other amendments "might, with equal propriety, be aimed
at any other local law or institution of a state." Amendments might,
for example, abolish freedom of religion or regulate marriages. In a
word, "the principle of the proposed amendment is the principle of
consolidation.... It is absurd to call a Federal Union wherein such
a principle of consolidation has been introduced into its fundamental laws a union of free and equal States."l7 "Where will it end,
when once begun?" asked Cox of Ohio. "Should we amend the
Constitution so as to change the relation of parent and child, guardian and ward, husband and wife, the laws of inheritance, the laws of
legitimacy?" IS Senator Davis of Kentucky captured the Democratic
concern perfectly when he insisted that "the power of amendment
as now proposed to be exercised," not so much the amendment itself, "imparts a power that would revolutionize the whole Government, and that would invest the amending power with a faculty of
destroying and revolutionizing the whole Government."l9
The supporters of the amendment made surprisingly little use
of the argument that is probably most attractive to twentieth century constitutionallawyers.2o As Anson Herrick, Democratic Congressman from New York put it, almost at the very last instant
before the House vote in which the amendment passed:
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
1976).

CoNG. GLOBE,

38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1489 (1864).

/d. at 2986.
38th Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1865).
38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1489 (1864).
Cf A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 409 (5th ed.
CONG. GLOBE,

CONG. GLOBE,
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By the adoption of the Constitution the States transferred to three-fourths of their
number their entire sovereignty, which can be at any time exerted to augment or
diminish the functions of the General Government. . . . Three-fourths of the States
can, by an amendment of the Constitution, exercise throughout the United States
any power that a State individually can exercise within its limits.21

For the most part, however, the amendment's proponents reacted more directly by attempting to show the amendment's deep
consistency with the Constitution. One form that took was the argument sometimes made by pre-War abolitionists,22 but very rarely
made by congressmen in 1864-65, that the Constitution already
abolished slavery in the states or empowered Congress to do so.
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts unequivocally expressed
this view on the floor of Congress in 1864-65 debates. He relied
especially on the due process clause of the fifth amendment, which,
he said, was "in itself alone a whole bill of rights ... an express
guarantee of personal liberty and an express prohibition against its
invasion anywhere." In this last Sumner went beyond orthodox
constitutional doctrine of the day which, following Chief Justice
Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore, held that the fifth amendment only
limited the general government.23 Sumner went even further beyond orthodox interpretation when he concluded that the prohibitory language of the due process clause was "a source of power" for
Congress to protect "life, liberty and property."24
Even though Sumner's analysis had some currency among extra-congressional abolitionist writers, few in Congress endorsed
Sumner's doctrine. The absence of any other evidence of support
for the view that the thirteenth amendment was merely declaratory
suggests that Jacobus ten Broek and Sidney Buchanan go too far
when they suggest this was in any sense an important issue in the
debates.2s
More significant was the effort to show that the principles of
the amendment coincided with those already embodied in the Constitution, but only imperfectly realized heretofore. The amendment's proponents largely accepted the constitutional principle
21. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 530 (1865).
22. For the abolitionist argument, see especially JACOBUS TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER
LAW (1965) (hereinafter TEN BROEK].
23. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833).
24. CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1474-82 (1864).
25. TEN BROEK, supra note 22, at 170-71; Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom (cbs. 1-8),
12 Houston L. Rev., I, 321, 357, 590, 610, 844, 871, 1070 (1975) [hereinafter Buchanan,
Quest]. ten Broek incorrectly claims that Ashley of Ohio on Jan. 6, 1865 supported the
declaratory view. Compare TEN BROEK at 171 with CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 138
(1865).
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regarding the use of the amending power as explained by Thomas
Davis of New York during the House debate:
When it appears to the people that there exists in the land an institution inconsistent
with that Constitution, inconsistent with the principles of our government, we ...
propose to them, in accordance with that Constitution, to determine ... whether or
not they will amend it, and thereby remove the evil, there is nothing despotic, nothing wrong ... in that we propose nothing which is not constitutional, nothing which
is not just. 26

Very early in the Senate debate, Republican Henry Wilson attempted to explain the inconsistency which the amendment attempted to remove:
Cannot we hear amid the wild rushing roar of this war storm the voice of Him who
rides upon the winds and rules the tempest saying unto us, "You cannot have peace
until you secure liberty to all who are subject to your laws?" Sir, this declaration
must be heeded. It has been whispered into the ears of this nation since first we
pronounced life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to be the inalienable rights of
all men ....

On the basis of that pronouncement, Americans established "our
free Government" with which slavery is "incompatible."21 A familiar theme in Republican political thought, the primacy of the principles of the Declaration of Independence within the American
political order-a theme given its consummate expression by Lincoln, but one which was widely shared in and out of Congress.2s
Surely the most eloquent statement of the point in these debates was
by Charles Sumner, who believed "it is only necessary to carry the
Republic back to its baptismal vows, and the declared sentiments of
its origins. There is the Declaration of Independence: let its solemn
promises be redeemed. There is the Constitution: let it speak, according to the promises of the Declaration."29 Not internal selfgovernance or states' rights, but "the promises of the Declaration"
are the ground of the American constitutional order.
The supporters went further in their efforts to prove the
amendment's legitimacy. Slavery, they said, was not only "incompatible with our free Government" in that it directly countered "the
great objects: for which the Constitution was established," but "it
has [also] confronted the Constitution itself, and prevented the enforcement of its most vital provisions."3o Senator Wilson had in
mind the violation not only of the spirit of the Constitution that
26. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 155 (1865).
27. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864).
28. For a beautiful account of Lincoln and the relation between the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, see HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED.
29. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1482 (1864).
30. /d. at 1202.
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slavery itself constituted, but also the direct violations of the Constitution's letter to which slavery led.
Wilson and the other Republicans were especially concerned
about the "privileges and immunities clause" of article IV, section
2. William Kelley, Republican representative from Pennsylvania,
asked one of his Democratic colleagues:
Does he not know that for more than thirty years those dear friends of his, for
whose institutions he and his party plead so fervently, have, not withstanding this
right so specifically guaranteed, denied not only the right of asylum, but the right of
transit through their States to us, who doubted the wisdom or divinity of chattel
slavery?" 31

Not only did Southern states violate the privileges and immunities
of citizens of Northern states, but they turned against their own
citizens as well.
You cannot go into a State of the North [said John A. Kasson, Republican oflowa]
in which you do not find refugees from Southern States who have been driven from
the States in the South where they had a right to live as citizens, because of the
tyranny which this institution exercised over public feeling and public opinion, and
even over the laws of those States. . . . Who does not know that we have abundant
proof that numbers of men in the State of Texas, Germans who had settled there,
quiet and peaceable men, have been foully murdered in cold blood because they
were known to be anti-slavery in sentiment?32

Among the privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution were not only the rights to asylum and transit, but also the
rights identified in the Bill of Rights. According to Senator Wilson,
these rights "belong to every American citizen ... wherever he may
be within the jurisdiction of the United States." But he asked,
"How have these rights essential to liberty been respected in those
sections of the Union where slavery held the reins of local authority
and directed the thoughts, prejudices, and passions of the people?"33 According to Wilson, all the rights identified in the first
amendment have been dishonored in the slave states. "The Constitution may declare the right, but slavery ever will, as it ever has,
trample upon the Constitution and prevent the enjoyment of the
right."
The cause of this dismal record of non-respect for the Constitution was the institution of slavery. "What then shall we do?" asked
Wilson. "Abolish slavery. How? By amending our national Constitution. Why? Because slavery is incompatible with free government." The amendment was necessary, said Representative Kasson,
"to carry into effect one clause of the Constitution [art. IV, sec. 2]
31.

/d. at 2984.

32.
33.

CONG. GLOBE,

CONG. GLOBE,

38th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1865).
38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864).
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which has been disobeyed in nearly every slave State of the Union
for some twenty or twenty-five, or thirty years past."J4 The abolition of slavery then was compatible with the Constitution because it
would remove the chief spur to persistent violation of the Constitution. The amendment would allow other important provisions of
the Constitution to come into their own. In this sense, the abolition
of slavery represented an enforcement of the original Constitution.
A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION?
Notwithstanding the insistence by the amendment's sponsors
that abolition of slavery was compatible with, or even completing of
the Constitution as it already was, a currently powerful line of interpretation among scholars-and on the Supreme CourtJs-insists
that the amendment was in substance and intent a constitutional
revolution.J6 Jacobus ten Broek's version of this argument is most
fully developed and has been immensely influential in the past
twenty years.
ten Broek's interpretation goes something like this. The reconstruction amendments were the fruit of an unorthodox line of constitutional and political thought that emerged among abolitionists
prior to the Civil War. The amendments represented the culmination of their hopes for the Constitution. Therefore, if we wish to
understand what the amendments mean, we need to pay attention
to the abolitionists' hopes, and in particular to the way they understood some of the key notions in the amendments, such as "privileges and immunities," or "protection of the law" in the fourteenth,
and liberty, as the negative of slavery, in the thirteenth.
The thirteenth amendment in particular needs to be set into its
own context, for our understanding of it suffers from the context in
which we now view it-as the first of a sequence of amendments
which progressively established greater degree of protection for the
34. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1865).
35. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
36. It is unclear which of the current views of the thirteenth amendment is dominant.
The revolutionary understanding of the thirteenth amendment is by no means uniformly held
by scholars, but my impression is that it is gaining in favor. It received a strong boost when
adopted recently by Sidney Buchanan in his book-length monograph (Buchanan, Quest, supra
note 25, at ch. I). It has also been endorsed by one of the deans of reconstruction constitutional history, Harold Hyman (HYMAN AND WIECEK, supra note 5, at ch. II). Of recent
constitutional historians, Herman Belz has most steadily held out against the revolutionary
view, and my conclusions are closest to his. (BELZ, supra note 6; BELZ, EMANCIPATION AND
EQUAL RIGHTS ch. 5 (1978)). The older generation of scholars for the most part did not
endorse this revolutionary view. (Cf C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 18641888, Part I, ch. XIX (1971)).
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freedmen.37 ten Broek, on the contrary, points out that the amendment's drafters did not contemplate it as a first step, but rather saw
it as the only constitutional change they needed. The thirteenth
amendment thus stands as the "consummation of abolitionism
broadly conceived. "Js
Moreover, he argues, the real issue in the Congressional debates was no longer slavery itself. "With the victory of northern
arms, slavery as a legal institution was at an end except in a few
border states where it could not hope to survive surrounded by free
institutions."39 The concern for an amendment therefore must have
gone beyond the mere legal existence of slavery. The amendment
did go beyond abolition "narrowly conceived" toward the full scale
rearranging of relations of power and responsibility in the constitutional system. That is, the amendment was meant to effect a
"revolution in federalism" in which the general government took on
responsibility for protecting fundamental rights. This accretion of
congressional power was signalled by section 2 of the amendment,
which goes beyond the prohibition of slavery and gives Congress
power to enforce the prohibition contained in section 1. Since the
prohibition would seem almost self-enforcing, of what use can the
empowerment of section 2 be? ten Broek has an answer ready at
hand: the prohibition of slavery actually establishes something positive-the status of freedom; freedom in turn requires certain legal
protections which Congress, under section 2, may supply. Thus,
congressional power under the amendment is quite sweeping, allowing Congress to establish the conditions of freedom, and to do so
relative to threats to freedom of all sorts, whether posed by individuals or public bodies and officers. As Buchanan put it, "supporters
envisioned for the amendment a scope of vast dimension." 40
The ten Broek view reverses the usual order of primacy given
to the reconstruction amendments-the thirteenth represents the
first and major step toward realization of the abolitionists' goals; the
fourteenth amendment merely restates the intent of the thirteenth in
different language. Or as Hyman and Wiecek put it, the thirteenth
supplies the key to the fourteenth.4I More than that, the thirteenth
supplies a very "open-ended national commitment about rights"; its
greater generality makes it especially suitable to express the "dynamic relationships among liberty, rights, and federalism." The
37. Cf MEYER, supra note 5, at 43-44.
38. TEN BROEK, supra note 22, at 157; Buchanan, Quest, supra note 25, at 8; HYMAN &
WIECEK, supra note 5, at 388-89; CURTIS, supra note 5, at 15, 48ff.
39. TEN BROEK, supra note 22, at 160; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 5, at 397.
40. Buchanan, Quest, supra note 25, at 2.
41. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 5, at 387-88.
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thirteenth amendment, they conclude, "was now part of a mobile
constitutional platform suitable for continual ascent."42
While much might and ought to be said about abolitionist constitutional theory, a few words will suffice here. In the first place,
ten Broek (and before him Howard J. Graham) has done a service
in calling attention to this tradition of constitutional thought. It
undeniably helps us understand the intellectual universe in which
the amendments were drafted, being especially helpful in elucidating some of the rather idiosyncratic views (from the perspective of
black-letter constitutional law) that appeared in the debates. Nonetheless, one cannot infer from some similarities between the views of
the men who drafted the amendments and pre-War abolitionist constitutional thought that the latter is identical with the former in all
important respects. That remains to be shown from the debates.
ten Broek and those who follow him are correct that at the
time the thirteenth amendment was drafted it was not expected to
be the first installment of a more comprehensive plan. Nonetheless,
the inference ten Broek and the others wish to draw does not necessarily follow. The bare facts may just as well support the opposite
view-on the basis of experience with the lesser remedy a perception of a need for further action emerged. Herman Belz surely
makes a plausible case when he accounts for the succession of
amendments in terms of a growing recognition "that the historic
instrument for excluding slavery from the territories [i.e., the thirteenth amendment's adoption of the language of the Northwest Ordinance] was not apposite for uprooting it where it had long
existed."43 A prima facie case for this alternative view can be made
from facts conceded by those who uphold the revolutionary interpretation. There was, say ten Broek and the others, a general (but
not universal) consensus that voting rights were not included in the
rights secured by either the thirteenth or the fourteenth amendments.44 The fifteenth amendment then does go beyond the thirteenth and fourteenth in an obvious way, and therefore the later
amendments go farther than the earlier. A final decision regarding
the relation between the amendments must await, however, a review
at a later date of the evidence surrounding the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the drafting of the fourteenth amendment.
According to ten Broek, by the time the thirteenth amendment
was being debated the question of slavery as such was already settled; the debate that occurred over the amendment was not over
42.
43.
44.

/d. at 401.
BELZ, supra note 6, at 134.
TEN BROEK, supra note 22, at 169.
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that already lost cause, but over "the [other] revolution which had
been in progress: the revolution in federalism."4s He implies that
the thirteenth amendment had little point if the mere existence of
slavery were the major issue. But even without his "revolution in
federalism" there were good reasons for the amendment, reasons
affirmed and reaffirmed frequently in the debates. First, the abolition that had been attained was achieved under Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, an executive action justified under the war
powers. Now the military importance of slave labor in the South no
doubt justified Lincoln's act; but in it he had declared the free slaves
"thenceforward and forever, free." Should restored Southern states
wish to reinstate slavery, what constitutional standing would the
Emancipation have? Under the Constitution as it had been, it
would presumably be within the power of a state to restore "the
peculiar institution." However much slavery may have appeared to
be in retreat, the desire to make abolition constitutionally secure
and nationally uniform was sufficient reason for the amendment.
Moreover, ten Broek may have been confident slavery would
inevitably die off in the places unaffected by the Proclamation, but
the supporters of the amendment-and its opponents as well-exhibited no such certainty in the debates. True, there were movements afoot in the loyal slave states for abolition; by the time of the
second House debate on the amendment in January 1965, Missouri
and Maryland had abolished slavery. When the amendment was
proposed none of this was certain, however, and slavery remained
in Delaware and Kentucky. And of course uncertainties remained
about the future in the deep South.
The mere existence of section 2 of the amendment, granting to
Congress "the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation," no more necessarily implies ten Broek's "revolution" than
the other evidence we have surveyed. The "first section alone," says
a ten Broek supporter, would have sufficed "simply to make slavery
unconstitutional." Section 2 was needed for the further "necessary"
task-"to grant freedom too, and for that the states could not be
trusted."46
Even if Congress intended a much narrower scope for the
amendment, there were several reasons to include section 2. The
clearest indication of what powers Congress anticipated exercising
in enforcement of the amendment was contained in sections 12 and
13 of the Wade-Davis bill. That bill, like the thirteenth amendment
itself a product of the Thirty-Eighth Congress, anticipated the
45.
46.

ld. at 160.
MEYER, supra

note 5, at 43.
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amendment by providing that "all persons held to involuntary service or labor in the States aforesaid are hereby emancipated and
discharged therefrom." Lincoln in his veto of the bill doubted the
"constitutional competency in Congress to abolish slavery in the
States," a doubt which led him to endorse a "constitutional amendment abolishing slavery throughout the Union."47 More to the
point of our present discussion, however, section 12 of the bill legislated an enforcement mechanism for the declaration of freedom:
"And if any such persons or their posterity shall be restrained of
liberty under pretense of any claim to such service or labor, the
Courts of the United States shall, on habeas corpus, discharge
them." And section 13 of the bill set penalties for persons convicted
of attempting to hold any freedman in "involuntary servitude or
labor."
Thus, even a narrow and largely self-executing provision for
emancipation requires some Congressional legislation in its support.
Now the "necessary and proper" clause of article I, section 8 might
be held to authorize such remedies as Congress attempted in the
Wade-Davis bill even without a provision like section 2 of the
amendment. Nonetheless, as Henry Meyer points out, an explicit
grant of power would have been considered valuable, in light of the
extensive criticism of the Supreme Court's affirmation of implied
Congressional power to enforce the fugitive slave clause in Prigg v.
Pennsy/vania.4s Indeed, the critics of Prigg were many of the same
men who now sponsored the thirteenth amendment.
Moreover, even if the amendment were to be largely self-enforcing, it nonetheless would then be enforced in the federal courts;
but the pre-War record of the federal courts on the question of slavery had been abysmal. Although Lincoln had appointed many new
justices of a friendlier disposition, the old Republican distrust of the
courts did not evaporate right away, and Congress could well have
seen the need to establish elsewhere a power to enforce
emancipation.
Finally, enforcement through courts puts a heavy burden on
individuals whose rights are at stake to initiate action in defense of
their rights. Individuals who are threatened by slavery are not well
positioned to take this kind of initiative. Thus, Congressmen might
well have thought that supplementary methods of enforcement,
such as the appointment of special officers to look after the legal
47. Abraham Lincoln, A Proclamation, reprinted in J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, VII, at 3424 (1897).
48. Prigg v. Pa., 16 Peters 539 (1842); MEYER, supra note 5, at 42.
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rights of the freedmen as provided in the Freedmen's Bureau Act,
would be necessary.
ten Broek put special weight on the concerns of the amendments's opponents. They believed that
[T]he measure constituted an unwarrantable invasion of the rights of the States and
a corresponding unwarrantable extension of the power of the central government.
In fact, so unwarrantable was the invasion and extension as to violate the basic
conditions of the federal compact, destroy the federal character of the government,
and subvert the whole constitutional system.49

One objection to ten Broek's argument concerns the logic of his
heavy reliance on opponents. In parliamentary debates opponents
have an incentive to overstate the consequences of measures in order to arouse fear and further opposition. Although the claims of
the opposition must be taken seriously, they cannot be given the
level of authoritativeness ten Broek grants them.
As we have already seen, the opponents did allege a revolution
in federalism, but that revolution consisted of the novel use of the
amending power to reach into the states. For the most part, they
did not make the further argument, which ten Broek attributes to
them, that the thirteenth amendment in itself inaugurated any additional constitutional revolution. The debate was over the amending
power primarily, and only secondarily over this amendment.
Some, it is true, did go further, but ten Broek presents their
position misleadingly. For example, William Holman, a Democrat
from Indiana, began his speech on June 15, 1864, with the usual
litany of opposition concerns about the amending power: "You propose to invade the domestic policy of States so solemnly guaranteed
by the Constitution and without which the Union would never have
been formed, and abolish African slavery, a subject foreign to the
Constitution, for it has no relation to domestic concerns of a
State."so So far, just the same as the other opponents we have already seen. The amendments transgresses in abolishing slavery
alone, without need for further transference of power to Congress.
But, Holman argues, "the amendment goes further."si ten
Broek quotes the following from Holman's explanation of the further depredation on the old Constitution: "[The amendment] confers on Congress the power to invade any state to enforce the
freedom of the African in war or peace. What is the meaning of all
that? Is freedom the simple exemption from personal servitude?
No Sir." At this point, however, ten Broek elides Holman's key
49.
50.
51.

TEN BROEK, supra note 22, at 160; cf Buchanan, Quest, supra note 25 at 6-7.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1864).
/d. at 2962.
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claim, without ever indicating the fact of an omission. But here is
what Holman said in the immediate sequel: "No sir; in the language of America it [freedom] means the right to participate in government, the freedom for which our fathers resisted the British
empire."52
This statement undermines ten Broek's argument in two different ways. Holman saw the broader implications of the amendment
not as those comprehended in ten Broek's revolution in federalism,
i.e., the grant of congressional power to "protect a wide range of
national constitutional rights,"53 but in arming blacks with political
power in their own states. He assumed that power to deal with the
"wide range of rights" would remain in the states as politically restructured through the addition of a black electorate. Secondly, the
broader implication Holman identified in the amendment was most
certainly not there. ten Broek himself finds little evidence that the
drafters of either the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments intended
to confer the suffrage. Sidney Buchanan, who largely follows ten
Broek, is even more emphatic: "Democratic spokesman often insisted that black enfranchisement was the ulterior aim of Republican leadership in seeking adoption of the thirteenth amendment ....
This end was never admitted by even the most extreme of Republican radicals. If such a purpose was entertained by those who supported the amendment, it belongs in the category of secret
intentions."54 That is, there is no reason to credit Holman's claims
about broader implication in the amendment.
ten Broek contends that "many of the consequences of the
amendment forecast by the opponents, far from being denied or
minimized by the sponsors, were espoused as the very objects desired and intended to be accomplished by the measure. "55 If he
means that the proponents accepted the contention that the amendment worked a "revolution" in the Constitution, then he is, as we
have seen, quite incorrect. The brunt of arguments favoring the
amendment went to showing just the contrary: how the amendment completed rather than overturned the Constitution.
On the other hand, since ten Broek has misconceived much of
the opposition to the amendment, he is correct to notice that its
supporters spent little time responding to the view he (incorrectly)
attributes to the opposition.
So far as supporters of the amendment did address themselves
52.
53.
54.
55.

/d.
TEN BROEK, supra note 22, at 173.
Buchanan, Quest, supra note 25, at II.
TEN BROEK, supra note 22, at 159.
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to issues such as those in ten Broek's "revolution in federalism,"
they tended to reject the broad claims he and his followers say they
espoused. Congressman Scofield, for example, asked, "[W]hat connection is there between centralization and emancipation?''s6 John
Kasson of Iowa made Scofield's point clearer when he called attention to the distinction between "consolidation" of the Union and
the "centralization" of the government. "Centralization means
when you take the power from the state and give it to the United
States. But when you take it both from the States and from the
United States there is not a particle of centralization of power."s7
And that, added Kasson, "is what this amendment does." It does
not establish in the federal government major new responsibilities
and powers; the amendment is negative and prohibitory, and thus
must be understood to address slavery in the narrow sense. George
Yeaman of Kentucky affirmed quite clearly that "in passing the
amendment we do make sure the final extinction of slavery, but so
far from endorsing the radical abolition party, we rob them of their
power."ss But it was precisely the "radical abolition party" that the
emerging scholarly consensus on the thirteenth amendment says
carried the day.
Now it is not that ten Broek (and Buchanan following him,
and Hyman and Wiecek following Buchanan) have no evidence
from supporters to underwrite their interpretation. But they have
systematically misunderstood the evidence they find. ten Broek directly quotes and paraphrases seven proponents as witnesses for his
revolutionary thesis. He gives most space to James Wilson of Iowa,
chair of the House Judiciary Committee, who made a long and obviously important speech introducing and explaining the draft
amendment to the House. ten Broek follows Wilson's recital of the
myriad ways in which slavery violated the spirit (and sometimes the
letter) of the Constitution, both in its own character, and in further
acts to which the defense of slavery led the Southern states. It is a
long list-the privileges and immunities clause, the first amendment's religion clause, its free speech and press clause, its guarantee
of a right of free assembly. As ten Broek quotes Wilson: "It is
quite time, Sir, for the people of the free States to look these facts
squarely in the face and provide a remedy which shall make the
future safe for the rights of each and every citizen."s9 And ten
Broek comments on this passage as follows: "That remedy, thus
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1865).
/d. at 239.
58. /d. at 171.
59. CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199 (1864).
56.

57.
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aimed at the broad objective of making 'the future safe for the rights
of ... every citizen,' was the seemingly narrow prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude contained in the thirteenth amendment."60 But, implies ten Broek, if the amendment was to be such a
remedy as all that, it must obviously not be the "narrow prohibition" it seems to be. We have already seen exactly how Wilson saw
the amendment as a remedy for all these violations: the abolition of
slavery would remove the irritant which had driven the slaveholders
to these many Constitutional violations. He gives no evidence here
of contemplating any further "revolution."
Most of ten Broek's other witnesses made the very same point.
He quotes E. L. Ingersoll of Illinois at some length, "waxing rhapsodic" on the effects of the amendment in securing rights. But it is
clear from the remainder of his speech that Ingersoll intended the
same point as Wilson did-the existence of the institution of slavery
led to the failure to respect the rights and interests of men; its fall
would lead to a reversal of that melancholy situation. Consider
what he said of the amendment's effect on the poor whites in the
South:
Slavery has kept them in ignorance, in poverty, and in degradation. Abolish slavery
and school houses will rise upon the ruins of the slave mart, intelligence will take
the place of ignorance, wealth of poverty, and honor of degradation; industry will
go hand in hand with virtue, and prosperity with happiness, and a disenthralled and
regenerated people will rise up and bless you and be an honor to the American
Republic. 61

Now surely Ingersoll did not mean that the amendment established
these broader goods as rights or as powers in Congress. These are
predictions-very sanguine predictions it turned out-of the almost
spontaneous benefits of the disappearance of slavery. Yet both ten
Broek and Buchanan lean heavily on Ingersoll to support their interpretation. ten Broek also quotes from James Ashley of Ohio.
But Ashley, too, was only making what is now a familiar argument.
As he says, "for more than thirty years past there is no crime
known among men which [slavery] has not committed under the
sanctions of law." And does it follow that Congress is to now acquire the powers to deal with every "crime known among men"?
No, the remedy for Ashley is exactly what it was for the others: "If
slavery is wrong and criminal ... it is certainly our duty to abolish
it. "62 Destroy the cause and the crimes will disappear in its wake.
Subtract all those who foresaw broader consequences as a result of
60.
61.
62.

/d. at 164.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864).
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1865).
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the abolition of slavery narrowly conceived, and precious few remain who can legitimately be adduced as supporters of the ten
Broek and Buchanan reading of the debates.
There was some support expressed for two broader views of the
amendment's meaning. But both views were more limited than
those reviewed above, and neither was so widely held or uncontested as to indicate that a consensus had formed around them.
Both broader positions in effect concluded that the abolition of slavery implied or involved the establishment of something positive,
either the full substantive rights of liberty, or the claims of equality.
According to ten Broek: "[S]lavery in its narrowest and strictest sense--slavery as legally enforceable personal servitude--would
thus be forever 'put down and extinguished'-this much the amendment would certainly do." But that, says ten Broek is not all the
amendment would do, for "the opposite of slavery is liberty." The
amendment would not only remove the lack of liberty, which is
slavery, but establish the positive status which is possession of liberty. Perhaps the clearest statement of such a view in the debates
was by radical Congressman William D. Kelley of Pennsylvania:
This proposed Amendment is designed to accomplish the very purpose with which
they charged us in the beginning, namely the abolition of slavery in the United
States and the political and social elevation of Negroes to all the rights of white
men.63

As Hyman and Wiecek succinctly put the point: "Freedom was
much more than the absence of slavery."
The power of this argument was revealed during the subsequent debates on the meaning of the thirteenth amendment when
Congress deliberated over the Civil Rights Act of 1866. But hardly
anything like this was said in the Thirty-Eighth Congress when it
pondered the adoption of the amendment. The absence of explicit
evidence makes it impossible to conclude that congressmen consciously entertained such a view. But that does not settle the issue
of whether the amendment means this broader establishment of
freedom nonetheless. A full treatment of that perhaps paradoxical
claim must wait for a discussion of the 1866 debates on the Civil
Rights Act, but we might notice here that the issue turns on a theoretical question of some difficulty and interest: What is slavery? Is
slavery something established, whether implicitly or explicitly by
state law, or is it rather a condition constituted by the absence of
certain legal protections which non-slaves enjoy? Might the removal
of explicit slave codes leave one in a state in which one is not a
63.

Jd. at 165-66.
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slave, in that the state will not endorse and make its various legal
and police machinery available to enforce claims to one's labor and
liberty, but on the other hand does not extend the full range of
rights that others enjoy? Or alternatively, does the enjoyment of the
status of non-slave imply necessarily the full protection of laws for
security of liberty and enjoyment of the full range of privileges of
civil life? Are there three statuses in effect-slavery, emancipation,
full legally secured freedom--or only two-slavery and full
freedom?64
Some clearly took for granted the narrower understanding.
Anson Herrick, for example, in an important speech near the end of
the debate asserted without hesitation that "the institution of slavery is purely a creation of law... ."6s John Henderson, Republican
senator from Missouri, was quite unequivocal. "So in passing this
amendment we confer upon the Negro no right except his freedom,
and leave the rest to the states."66 And Northerners were perfectly
familiar with the intermediate situation which the narrower view of
abolition implied, for free blacks lived in Northern states in just
such a condition, not slave, yet not enjoying all the rights of the
community.67
Some important actions by leading congressional radicals suggest that if any view of the amendment prevailed it was the narrower one. After the amendment was adopted Thaddeus Stevens
introduced a new amendment: "All national and state laws shall be
equally applicable to every citizen, and no discrimination shall be
made on account of race or color."6s Apparently, Stevens did not
believe such "equal application" of the law was mandated by the
thirteenth amendment itself.
A more significant incident occurred during the short Senate
debate on the thirteenth amendment. Charles Sumner rose to express dissatisfaction "with the form of expression" used in the proposed amendment. He preferred other language:
All persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave;
and the Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to carry
this declaration into effect everywhere within the United States and the jurisdiction
64. The issue really parallels quite closely that ultimately raised almost one-hundred
years after Reconstruction when the Supreme Court declared state established segregation
unconstitutional. Is the opposite of state supported segregation, integration, or is it nonsegregation?
65. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1865).
66. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1465 (1864).
67. See L. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY (1965).
68. See W. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS, CoNGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION 18651867, 100 (1966), for a discussion of Stevens's proposal.
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thereof.69

Sumner defended his version in narrow linguistic terms, but there is
a clear substantive difference between the two drafts. Where the
amendment as proposed and adopted established that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United
States," Sumner's version added the claim about "the equality of all
persons before the law," and granted explicit congressional power
to assure that equality. Sumner's proposal was met with resounding
indifference, and where not indifference, clear opposition.
It was understood to be a great virtue of the language proposed
that it derived from the Jeffersonian language of the Northwest Ordinance. Jacob Howard of Michigan pressed the pont hardest. "I
prefer ... to go back to the ... language employed by our fathers in
the Ordinance of 1787, an expression which has been adjudicated
upon repeatedly, which is perfectly well understood both by the
public and by judicial tribunals.... "7o According to Herman Belz,
who has made the most complete survey of the legal meaning of the
Northwest Ordinance, the accepted meaning was the narrow one,
not extending so far as Sumner's "equal before the law."11 By contrast Howard was quite insistent that "in a legal and technical sense
that language ['equal before the law'] is utterly insignificant and
meaningless as a clause of the Constitution," and he challenged
Sumner "to say what effect this would have in law in a court of
justice."
Significantly, Sumner failed to take up the challenge, backing
off at the first sign of opposition from fellow Republicans. Howard
made a somewhat cryptic remark which suggested the substantive
underpinning to his concerns.
Besides, the proposition speaks of all men being equal. I suppose before the law a
woman would be equal to a man. . . . A wife would be equal to her husband ...
before the law.

Now there is a certain ambiguity to Howard's remark, but his point,
I think is this: even though men and women, or husbands and
wives have different legal statuses, they are nonetheless "equal
before the law." The phrase therefore does little or nothing by way
of defining legal status beyond the bare prohibition of slavery, and
alternatively, if it does do more, Howard seems prepared to oppose
it for that reason.
So far as Sumner attempted to commit the country explicitly to
69.
70.
71.
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a constitutional guarantee of a broader sort than mere emancipation, that effort must be said to have been rebuffed. The friends of
the amendment saw the need neither to accept Sumner's more farreaching version of an amendment nor to claim the amendment
they had already accomplished what Sumner sought.
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT-A DEFECTIVE
COMPLETION
The supporters and opponents of the thirteenth amendment
joined issue on the question of whether it completed or overturned
the Constitution. As is the case with all genuine constitutional disputes, there was something serious to be said on both sides, but
those who argued for the amendment had the stronger case. The
original Constitution did not simply embody state autonomy respecting all matters of internal governance and ordering. The original Constitution was never so narrow and crabbed as Samuel Cox's
list of three functions would suggest. One need think only of article
I, section 10 which set limits on the powers of the states, for example, to make ex post facto laws or to impair the obligations of contract. These express limits were in fact the transformed and
truncated version of Madison's proposed universal negative. Also
significant is the provision in article IV guaranteeing to each state
"a republican form of government," a clear indication of national
concern over how the states are ordered internally. At the same
time, that commitment was sharply limited, and the internal autonomy of the states clearly was the rule to which these provisions were
exceptions.
From James Madison's perspective the aspiration to "complete
the Constitution" is even more clearly legitimate. Indeed, there was
a remarkable parallel between Madison's perception of what the
system required and what the amendment's framers attempted to
supply. Madison saw his universal system serving two purposes:
making rights secure in the states, and guarding against encroachments by states on each other and on the federal government. The
thirteenth amendment was intended to improve the security of
rights in the states by directly forbidding the most blatant violations
of rights by the states, and by removing the goad that prompted
them to intrude on the rights of citizens of other states, on the prerogatives of other states, and on the powers of the federal
government.
Yet the amendment differed greatly from Madison's proposal.
Madison attempted to institute a political process that would operate as a matter of course to review every action by the states; the
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amendment proceeds instead more according to the model adopted
in the original constitution as a substitute for Madison's processan explicit constitutional limit to be enforced by the courts and, at
least in this case, by Congress as well. The Constitution as adopted,
and as amended, is much more legalistic than Madison thought desirable. The solution adopted in the amendment also went nowhere
near as far as Madison's negative--unless one interprets the amendment in the way ten Broek and company do. Even then its scope
would fall considerably short of Madison's negative on "all laws
whatsoever."
On the other hand, the amendment goes beyond the negative in
two respects. Congressional power under the amendment is not
necessarily limited only to a negative, or disallowing power. And in
committing the entire nation against slavery, the amendment has a
clearer substantive commitment than did Madison's procedural solution. Indeed, it remains a case for great speculation as to how the
negative would have been used regarding slavery if adopted, and it
is an intriguing question what Madison himself anticipated on this
score.
Although the amendment parallels in several ways Madison's
favored device, it must be judged inadequate as a completing of the
Constitution. Immediate subsequent history-two further amendments adopted hardly before the ink was dry on the certificates of
ratification for the thirteenth-shows that clearly enough. The
chief failing of the amendment lay in the lack of proper thought
given to the meaning and implications of the commitment to
emancipation.
There were two key questions which few men in the ThirtyEighth Congress recognized. The first question concerned the issue
we have discussed already-what, if any, positive rights or claims
follow from the abolition of slavery? Is there something between
slave status and full citizen status? As we have seen, the framers of
the amendment tended to take for granted a narrower view of the
implications of emancipation, but without evidence of having
thought very much about the question. That thoughtlessness derived in part at least from the sanguine, not to say extravagant, expectations of the amendment's supporters about its indirect effects.
Since America was a federal system, a second question arose.
In a unitary system it would be enough to settle what positive rights
flowed from emancipation; but in the dual constitutional system of
the United States, the further question existed of which government
had responsibility to provide for those rights. The framers hardly
considered this second question because they hardly confronted the
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first. Expecting all good things to flow nearly spontaneously from
abolition, they could avoid the hard choices about American federalism the second question posed. For if emancipation had positive
implications, then it might not be possible to leave responsibility for
securing such rights where it had been-with the states. And if that
responsibility were transferred to the federal government, that
would indeed make for the revolution ten Broek identified. But the
amendment's drafters hadn't seen this far and certainly in 1864-65
never made any such commitments.
An adequate completing of the Constitution would have required at least that the two questions be confronted. In 1866, during debate on the Civil Rights Act, the first question rose to an
urgency and received some very fine analysis indeed, analysis ultimately carried to its peak by John Bingham of Ohio, a man who
had not served in the Thirty-Eighth Congress. The debate on the
Civil Rights Act pushed the federalism question forward, but it received adequate resolution only in the later debates on the fourteenth amendment. n Thus both strands converged on the later
amendment, and it alone can truly make the claim of having completed the Constitution. But how those questions were answered in
the fourteenth amendment-that too is a long story.

12. Cf Zuckert, Congressional Power Under the Founeenth Amendment, 3 CONST.
COMM. 123 (1986).

